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Recent Cases
troller need not require reimbursement
if the Bank's disclosure errors involved
only "technical and nonsubstantive"
violations that did not adversely affect
the information provided to the consumer. Since its disclosure errors resulted from its officers' unfamiliarity
with the Commentary and did not mislead or deceive the borrowers, the Bank
asserted that TILA did not require the
Comptroller to order reimbursement.
The court, however, disagreed and held
that the Bank's failure to disclose a
composite interest rate defeated a central purpose of TILA: to enable borrowers to compare credit terms offered
by other lenders.
Reimbursement Only for Loans
Made Since "Immediately
Preceding" Examination
TILA authorized the Comptroller to
order reimbursement from the Bank to
borrowers whom the Bank had erroneously disclosed the composite interest
rate for loans made since the date of the
"immediately preceding examination."
The Comptroller conducted an examination of the Bank on December 31,
1987, neglecting to examine the Bank's
compliance with TILA and Regulation
Z. The Bank contended that TILA
only authorized the Comptroller to order reimbursement for loans made since
the 1987 examination, the "immediately preceding examination."
In contrast, the Comptroller argued
that TILA authorized it to order reimbursement on the basis of loans the
Bank had made since June 30, 1985, the
date of the last previous examination in
which the Comptroller had examined
the Bank's compliance with TILA and
Regulation Z. Further, the Comptroller contended that the legislative purpose of this portion of TILA required
the court to interpret the phrase "immediately preceding examination" to refer to the immediately preceding examination of the same type as the one
during which the Comptroller discovered the violations.
The court, however, agreed with the
Bank that TILA only authorized the
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Comptroller to order reimbursement
for loans made since the 1987 examination. The court noted that the language of the statute referred only to the
immediately preceding examination and
did not distinguish between examinations of different types. Since the
language of the statute was clear, the
court held that it meant exactly what it
stated. Consequently, the Comptroller
could only order reimbursement on the
basis of loans made since the date of the
December 31, 1987 examination.
Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part
The court affirmed the Comptroller's
finding that the Bank's failure to disclose a composite interest rate constituted a violation of TILA and Regulation Z. In addition, the court found that
the Bank's failure to make such disclosures on almost 700 loans over a two
year period constituted a "pattern or
practice" of violations. However, the
court vacated the Comptroller's order
of reimbursement for the period from
January 31, 1985 to June 30, 1988 and
remanded the case to the Comptroller
to consider whether or not to order
reimbursement for the discounted variable interest rate loans made from December 31, 1987 to June 30, 1988. *t
Colby M. Green

Fraud Hotline
Consumers who receive telephone calls or postcards telling
them they have won prizes can
now call a toll-free number to
find out if the offer is fraudulent.
The National Fraud Information
Center, at (800)-876-7060, has
been established by a coalition
of groups battling telephone
fraud. The hotline operates from
the National Consumers League
from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. Eastern
time.

Insurance Liability Occurs
at the Installation of a
Potentially Dangerous
Product
In Eljer Manufacturing, Inc. v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance, 972 F.2d
805 (7th Cir. 1992), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that physical injury to tangible property from a defective plumbing system occurred at the installation
of the product in a house, not when the
product actually malfunctioned and
caused physical damage.
Insurance, Plumbing, and Water
Between 1979 and 1986, U.S. Brass,
a subsidiary of Eljer Manufacturing
Inc., manufactured and sold a plumbing system called "Qest" to plumbing
contractors. One-half to three-quarters
of a million Qest systems were installed
behind walls, below floors, or above
ceilings in houses and apartments.
Complaints about leaks began within a
year after the installation of the first
units. Eventually, about 5 percent of
the installed systems failed. By 1990,
home owners and contractors filed several hundred lawsuits involving almost
17,000 Qest systems.
The suits filed by the contractors
and homeowners presented basically
two types of claims. The first claim
based its recovery on actual system
leakage, which caused the home to be
water damaged, uninhabitable, or reduced in value. The second claim,
based recovery not on actual system
leakage, but rather on the homeowner's
replacement of the system, which caused
deprivation of home usage during the
replacement period.
Liberty Mutual Insurance ("Liberty") issued Eljer a series of annual
policies between 1979 through 1988.
Travelers Insurance provided Eljer
excess coverage between 1982 and 1986.
These policies covered property damage liability accidentally caused by Eljer
or its subsidiaries. Eljer brought this
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suit to the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois
against its primary insurer, Liberty, on
the issue of whether its insurance covered the claims based on the plumbing
system's failure.
Lower Court Finds Limited Liability
The district court held that water
damage from the leaks constituted property damage, and that the policy in
force at the time of installation covered
the loss-of-use claims.
Eljer requested declaratory judgment to determine the scope of insurance coverage regarding the physical
injury to tangible property and the lossof-use concerning tangible property
not physically injured. Eljer argued
that all of the "property damage" inflicted by the defective Qest systems
occurred during the installation of the
systems in years that Liberty's insurance policies were in force. Eljer
contended that physical injury to property occurred at the time of installation
of the Qest system in the buyer's home,
not when it began to leak, was replaced,
or reduced the home's value. Liberty,
however, argued that the property
damage did not occur until the system
actually leaked or when the homeowner, realizing that the Qest system
reduced the value of his home, replaced
the system.
The district court agreed with Liberty that property damage did not occur
at the installation of the defective system and concluded that property damage occurred when the leak occurred or
at the time of repair or replacement in
anticipation of a leak. Eljer appealed
the district court's ruling to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Liberty and Travelers appealed, contending that the district court
should not have ruled on the loss-ofuse claims with no leak because that
issue had not been presented to the
court.
The Ticking Time Bomb Rule
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holdVolume 5 Number 2 / Winter 1993

ing that Eljer was not entitled to a
declaratory judgment about the lossof-use claims. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit found that Eljer was entitled to insurance coverage under the
"incorporation doctrine," where a potentially dangerous product is incorporated into another structure. The appellate court also found that the lower
court misinterpreted the definition of
property damage liability in the industry-wide standard-form insurance
policy known as Comprehensive General Liability Insurance ("CGL").
The appellate court focused on the
conflict between the connotations of
the term "physical injury" and the objective of insurance. The court looked
at the contractual language of both a
1966 CGL policy and an updated 1973
version which "incorporated" both
physical injury and loss of use. The
court concluded that the drafters of the
1973 version intended "physical injury" to mean loss that results from
physical contact or physical linkage.
Such linkage occurred when a potentially dangerous product was "incorporated" into another, eventually causing
physical injury like a ticking time bomb.
The court supported its incorporation doctrine by first analogizing it to
fixtures in property law, when improvements to property are made and
cannot be removed without damaging
the property. Second, the court looked
at intentional and unintentional torts
and distinguished touching and nontouching torts (loosely physical versus
economic damages). Historically,
people did not claim a loss in instances
in which their property had not been
physically damaged. The court went
on to explain that the growing demand
for insurance against liability for loss
of use unaccompanied by "physical
injury" set the stage for the drafting of
a new, broad definition for "physical
injury" in the 1973 CGL policy.
The court of appeals further noted
that this new definition of "physical
injury" satisfies the objective of insurance to spread risks. Parties to insurance contracts want to avoid risk and

will pay a premium to avoid the small
possibility of large loss. Once a risk
becomes a physical certainty, insurance has no function. In this instance,
the court found both Eljer and Liberty
to be sophisticated business parties.
Between such sophisticated business
parties, the term "physical injury" was
meant to distinguish between physical
and non-physical injury. As a result,
the court's broad interpretation of the
term allowed the policy coverage to be
real and not illusory.
The Seventh Circuit next examined
the incorporation issue in relation to
New York and Illinois law. The court
found that New York courts accepting
incorporation under the 1966 CGL
policy but found little New York law
interpreting the 1973 version. The
majority concluded that Illinois law
provided little guidance on the 1973
definition of "physical injury." Because of the lack of clarity in previous
decisions of the Illinois Appellate
Court, First District, and the Illinois
Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit
relied on Marathon Plastics, Inc. v.
InternationalIns. Co., 161 Ill.App.3d
452 (4th Dist. 1987) and Elco Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
90 Ill.App.3d 1106 (1st Dist. 1980) for
support of the incorporation doctrine.
In both Marathon and Elco, the absence of physical injury in the normal
sense was immaterial for liability in the
context of incorporation.
Therefore, Illinois case law, the drafting history of the property-damage
clause, and the parties' understanding
of the liability contracts persuaded the
Seventh Circuit that the incorporation
of a defective product into another
product inflicts "physical injury" on
the latter product at the moment of
incorporation. The Seventh Circuit
thus reversed the district court judgment and remanded the case for entry
of a judgment for Eljer.
The Contamination Theory
Judge Cudahy's dissent stated that
an accurate reading of the contract
policy language and Illinois cases re-
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vealed that mere installation does not
constitute physical injury to property.
First, Judge Cudahy contended that the
words "physical injury" must be given
a literal, plain sense meaning. The
judge further argued that the purpose
of insurance does not extend to risks
that were not bargained for ahead of
time. In addition, the court noted that
the relevant parties for interpreting the
language of the contract are Eljer, Liberty, and Travelers, and not the drafters
of the CGL standard policy. *

In Citizens and Southern National
Bank v. Thomas B. Hamilton Co.,
969 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1992), the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that a merchant
bank could not terminate a credit card
agreement with a merchant who had
filed for reorganization under chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court
affirmed the decisions of the bankruptcy court and the district courts in
finding that the agreement in question
did not have the primary purpose of
providing financial accommodations,
and therefore the bank could not terminate it after a bankruptcy filing.

parties, which usually amounted to 96
percent of the transaction amount.
C & S paid Hamilton within a few days
of the purchase by direct deposit into a
commercial checking account that
Hamilton maintained at C & S. The
bank would then present the sales
drafts to the card-issuing bank, which
would arrange for a transfer of funds
from MasterCard or Visa to C & S, and
bill the cardholder for the amount of
the purchase.
In the event that a valid cardholder
disputed an item on his bill, the cardissuing bank would have a right of
chargeback against the merchant bank,
in this case C & S. The agreement
between C & S and Hamilton provided
that under certain circumstances C & S
would be able to pass this chargeback
on to Hamilton. Situations in which
C & S would have this right included
returned merchandise, illegible sales
drafts, and any other situation which
may have been caused by Hamilton.
The agreement provided three ways for
C & S to protect itself from being billed
for a chargeback that Hamilton could
not or would not cover: it could deduct
amounts owed from Hamilton's checking account; it could demand prompt
payment for the chargeback amount; or
it could hold a portion of the payments
it owed Hamilton on reserve to cover
future chargebacks.
In June 1989, Hamilton filed for
chapter 11 reorganization. C & S
required Hamilton to reapply for a
credit card merchant agreement and
rejected its application because of
Hamilton's uncertain financial future.

Credit Card Merchant Agreement
Thomas B. Hamilton Co., Inc.
("Hamilton") was a retail merchant
which had an ongoing credit card agreement with Citizens and Southern National Bank ("C & S"). This agreement
allowed Hamilton to accept the
MasterCard or Visa credit cards presented by its customers. C & S, as the
merchant bank, would purchase the
sales drafts from these retail transactions at a discount agreed to by both

The Dispute
Section 365(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code does not allow a party to an
executory contract to terminate that
contract solely because of another
party's bankruptcy filing, unless the
contract is "a contract to make a loan,
or extend other debt financing orfinancial accommodations, to or for the
benefit of the debtor, or to issue a
security of the debtor." C & S argued
that the credit card agreement was an

-

Sharon Hannaford

Bank Cannot Terminate
Credit Card Agreement
with Store Involved in
Bankruptcy Proceedings
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extension of financial accommodations
by C & S to Hamilton, and the bank
could therefore terminate it upon
Hamilton's bankruptcy filing. Hamilton contended that the agreement was
not a contract for financial accommodations, and therefore Hamilton's
trustee in bankruptcy could assume it.
Not a Contractto Extend Financial
Accommodations
The court looked both at precedent
and at the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code in concluding that
the agreement between Hamilton and
C & S was not a contract to extend
financial accommodations. The court
determined that the term "financial
accommodations" should be narrowly
construed to mean "the extension of
money or credit to accommodate another." In defining the term this way,
the court said a distinction must be
made between contracts whose primary
purpose was to extend some sort of
credit and contracts in which some
extension of credit was merely incidental to a larger purpose.
Here, the court found that the agreement between Hamilton and C & S was
for the sale of credit card sales drafts.
Hamilton could sell its products to
credit card customers, and C & S could
make a small profit on these sales as the
merchant bank. The real credit was
extended from the credit card issuing
bank to the consumer; the issuing bank
bore the risk of nonpayment of a valid
charge by a consumer. The terms of the
agreement between C & S and Hamilton
did not contemplate any extension of
credit from C & S to Hamilton. Any
credit that may have been extended to
Hamilton in this arrangement was incidental to the larger purposes of the
agreement.
The court further noted that there
was not a significant risk that C & S
would be harmed by a continuing relationship with Hamilton. The two parties had enjoyed a good relationship for
several years, and Hamilton did not
owe C & S any money. The court
reminded C & S that the terms of the
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